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There's recently been a pretty interesting spate of articles on Truehoop about tanking. Starting from the premise that it is a bad thing, various proposals are offered to eliminate it without alienating the primary stakeholders in the economic system.

http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_ ... eflections

I'm curious if anyone has any particular thoughts. These are mine.

(1) What is tanking? Is it playing players in games when there are better players on the bench? Is it calling suboptimal plays, whoever happens to be on the court? Is it just a codeword for general franchise incompetence?

(2) How much tanking is there really? How many points per game, on average, are coughed up by the representative tanker?

(3) Is tanking a bad thing? Accepting the proposition, all else equal, that it is a "good" thing if every member of every franchise is doing its best to win at every moment in time, there are other desiderata. Tanking is but one component of the incompetence that exists within the NBA (its key distinction being that it is intentional) and I suspect that its share is relatively small. What such "imperfections" allow is the competitive balance we actually see within the league, with some teams prospering at the expense of others. But would a league tending to regress more to the mean be a more desirable outcome? Maybe, but maybe not.

(4) Henry Abbott in his summaries and contributions seems to be pushing the line that if only teams would cull the dead wood from front offices that tanking would be unnecessary as a mode for franchise improvement. This is a fine partial equilibrium story, but what is interesting is the general. What happens (in the fullness of time) when we arrive in the paradise of everyone in front offices being above average? That bit is clear: general excellence begets mediocrity (and mean reversion). When everyone is excellent in a zero-sum game, by definition no one is. Abstracting from the impediments imposed by the collective bargaining agreement, in such a world there would be no suckers for any savvy general manager to exploit and randomness, primarily, will determine league outcomes.

(5) Finally, I think the series would have been better served by emphasizing the historical importance of tanking. To truly be defined as championship-driven, the willingness to tank, given the right circumstances, must be a cornerstone of your franchise. If you look at the teams that have won championships, every single one has depended on access to at least one hyper-elite player and there are extremely few of these. And these players in the past have been highly identifiable in the draft, and today, their talents are foreseen with even greater clarity. If you want to win a championship, you require one of these players, and the absolute best place to get them (and keep them) is by drafting them.

(1) What is tanking? Is it playing players in games when there are better players on the bench? Yes Is it calling suboptimal plays, whoever happens to be on the court? Yes and not always enforcing high standards on execution on shots, defense, etc. to the max ability. Is it just a codeword for general franchise incompetence? It is a mix of that and not fighting that by trading players or firing coaches & GMs at your earlier opportunity and awareness that it will be necessary to get better.


(2) How much tanking is there really? How many points per game, on average, are coughed up by the representative tanker?
This could be quantified perhaps but looking at average decline in net points per game for bottom 5-8 teams in say Feb-Apr. or least mid-March to end of season compared to earlier part of season.

(3) Is tanking a bad thing? I don't feel a need to dig for a deep philosophical answer or dwell on that. If you teams as engaged in different stages of multiple opportunities to win a title simultaneously (this year, next year, etc.) then you can rationalize behavior in period 1 that may not help prospects in period 1 but can help period 2, etc. as being productive for a future period when really nothing is going to make the results of period 1 important or satisfying.


(4) Henry Abbott in his summaries and contributions seems to be pushing the line that if only teams would cull the dead wood from front offices that tanking would be unnecessary as a mode for franchise improvement. This is a fine partial equilibrium story, but what is interesting is the general. What happens (in the fullness of time) when we arrive in the paradise of everyone in front offices being above average? That bit is clear: general excellence begets mediocrity (and mean reversion). When everyone is excellent in a zero-sum game, by definition no one is. Abstracting from the impediments imposed by the collective bargaining agreement, in such a world there would be no suckers for any savvy general manager to exploit and randomness, primarily, will determine league outcomes. There are significant weak links at every level. It might be useful to compare average player, head coach, other staff and GM tenure and average tenure based in various performance marks. It is my guess that GM tenure is probably longer overall and for comparable team performance experiences than players and head coaches. The middle layer of other staff is probably higher too. It would be interesting to see that broken out by team too. Anywhere looking for a research project?

(5) Finally, I think the series would have been better served by emphasizing the historical importance of tanking. To truly be defined as championship-driven, the willingness to tank, given the right circumstances, must be a cornerstone of your franchise. If you look at the teams that have won championships, every single one has depended on access to at least one hyper-elite player and there are extremely few of these. And these players in the past have been highly identifiable in the draft, and today, their talents are foreseen with even greater clarity. If you want to win a championship, you require one of these players, and the absolute best place to get them (and keep them) is by drafting them. The willingness to tank can be preceding or borne of bad recent circumstances. Winning less than 30% of games might be a standard for suspicion of tanking but of course it is not clear proof of that. Winning less than 30% of games for several straight years after being well above .500 would be stronger grounds for suspicion. Especially if the head coach is cheap, inexperienced or not well regarded. And the nature of trade activity would further strengthen the case, the subjective outsider case.

There is more that could be said. Not sure if the time is right for it. But for what it is worth, that is one reply.

I can see a team tanking at the team construction level and/or a team tanking at the team level.

I'll address the second possibility first. To me, tanking at the team level is a conscious effort on the part of the coach, the players, or both to not attempt to be successful in a given season. I am careful not to say "try to win each game at all costs," because we know teams occasional rest players for the greater good of the team long term. I can't see teams consistently throwing games as good for the league in any way.

Tanking can also occur at the team construction level. When Philadelphia dealt Jrue Holiday for Noel and a 2014 first, they had to believe it would hurt their team in the short term. A worse record in 2013-14 likely means a higher draft pick in the highly touted 2014 draft. Did Philly consider the possible value in their own pick as part of the value coming back in this trade? I don't know that this is bad for the league. I think it adds an interesting dynamic. Philly probably wasn't going to be a serious contender anyways, now their fans can get excited about the young players they have and the young players they might draft. I think most fans would trade a number of mediocre seasons for a few bad ones and a few really good ones.

Is tanking at the team construction level a good strategy for the eventual success of the franchise? On the one hand, no top 3 pick since Duncan has carried the team that drafted him to a championship (Darko doesn't count). And that Spurs team only had that pick because of a Robinson injury. They were much better when they drafted Duncan than a typical tanking team. On the other hand, many high picks have transformed teams into contenders. Howard, LeBron, Durant, ... all took the team that drafted them to the NBA finals. The analytics are challenging because every team situation is so different, and every draft class unique.

I personally like a rebuilding strategy that incorporates opportunistic trades. Here, I am thinking of examples like Houston's trade for Harden and Phoenix's trade for Bledsoe.